Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Michael L. Katz
University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group
UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC01-23
We explore the logic of predation and rules designed to prevent it in markets subject to network effects. Although, as many have informally argued, predatory behavior is plausibly more likely to succeed in such markets, we find that it is particularly hard to intervene in network markets in ways that improve welfare. We find that imposition of the leading proposals for rules against predatory pricing may lower or raise consumer welfare, depending on conditions that may be difficult to identify in practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: market structure, monopoly, networks, PB
JEL Classification: L12, L15, L41working papers series
Date posted: February 27, 2004
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