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Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups


Daniel Friedman


University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Nirvikar Singh


University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics

January 2004

UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 559

Abstract:     
We discuss how small group interactions overcome evolutionary problems that might otherwise erode vengefulness as a preference trait. The basic viability problem is that the fitness benefits of vengeance often do not cover its personal cost. Even when a sufficiently high level of vengefulness brings increased fitness, at lower levels, vengefulness has a negative fitness gradient. This leads to the threshold problem: how can vengefulness become established in the first place? If it somehow becomes established at a high level, vengefulness creates an attractive niche for cheap imitators, those who look like highly vengeful types but do not bear the costs. This is the mimicry problem, and unchecked it could eliminate vengeful traits. We show how within-group social norms can solve these problems even when encounters with outsiders are also important.

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Date posted: March 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Friedman, Daniel and Singh, Nirvikar , Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups (January 2004). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 559. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=509244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.509244

Contact Information

Daniel Friedman (Contact Author)
University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )
Social Sciences I
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4981 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Nirvikar Singh
University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )
Social Sciences I
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4093 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)
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