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What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence


Luc Laeven


International Monetary Fund (IMF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stijn Claessens


International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 6, 2003

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3113

Abstract:     
Using bank-level data, Claessens and Laeven apply the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology to estimate the extent to which changes in input prices are reflected in revenues earned by specific banks in 50 countries' banking systems. They then relate this competitiveness measure to indicators of countries' banking system structures and regulatory regimes. The authors find systems with greater foreign bank entry and fewer entry and activity restrictions to be more competitive. They find no evidence that the competitiveness measure negatively relates to banking system concentration. Their findings confirm that contestability determines effective competition, especially by allowing (foreign) bank entry and reducing activity restrictions on banks.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study competition in the financial sector.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Banking, competition, contestability, Panzar and Rosse

JEL Classification: D4, G21, L11, L80, O16

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Date posted: February 29, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Laeven, Luc A. and Claessens, Stijn, What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence (August 6, 2003). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3113. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=509605

Contact Information

Luc A. Laeven (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-6239020 (Phone)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Stijn Claessens
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7641 (Phone)
202-5897641 (Fax)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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