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Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence
Gary Charness University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics Peter Kuhn University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) December 15, 2006 Abstract: We study worker behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers' wages can influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' responsiveness to co-workers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages. Our laboratory experiments, on the other hand, show that - while workers' effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages - effort is not affected by co-workers' wages. This casts doubt on the notion that workers' concerns with equity might explain pay policies such as wage compression, or wage secrecy.
Keywords: Wage compression, wage secrecy, wage inequality, experiment, gift exchange JEL Classifications: A13, B49, C91, J31, J41 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: March 02, 2004 ; Last revised: January 05, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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