Designing a Shareholder Access Rule
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461
This paper examines the specific features of the shareholder access rule recently proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I suggest that, even accepting the Commission's generally cautious approach and its desire to limit shareholder access to cases where the need for it is evident, the restrictions included in the rule proposal are excessive and should be relaxed. In particular, I identify several changes in these restrictions that would contribute to attaining the policy goals that the proposed rule seeks to serve.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC.
JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 4, 2004 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009
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