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http://ssrn.com/abstract=511882
 
 

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Designing a Shareholder Access Rule


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2004

Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461

Abstract:     
This paper examines the specific features of the shareholder access rule recently proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I suggest that, even accepting the Commission's generally cautious approach and its desire to limit shareholder access to cases where the need for it is evident, the restrictions included in the rule proposal are excessive and should be relaxed. In particular, I identify several changes in these restrictions that would contribute to attaining the policy goals that the proposed rule seeks to serve.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC.

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

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Date posted: March 4, 2004 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., Designing a Shareholder Access Rule (2004). Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=511882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.511882

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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