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External Churning and Internal Flexibility: Evidence on the Functional Flexibility and Core-Periphery Hypotheses

Peter Cappelli
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Center for Human Resources; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David Neumark
University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics; Public Policy Institute of California; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)



Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 148-182, January 2004

Abstract:     
Functionally flexible systems for organizing work may reduce job instability and insecurity by reducing employers' reliance on job cuts or contingent work to respond to changes in their environments. Related arguments hypothesize that contingent work allows firms to adjust labor while "buffering" their core of permanent workers from job instability. We find evidence that internally flexible work systems are associated with reduced involuntary and voluntary turnover in manufacturing but that contingent work and involuntary turnover of the permanent workforce are positively related regardless of sector, in contrast to the prediction of the core-periphery hypothesis.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: March 23, 2004 ; Last revised: April 07, 2004

Suggested Citation

Cappelli, Peter and Neumark, David, External Churning and Internal Flexibility: Evidence on the Functional Flexibility and Core-Periphery Hypotheses. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 148-182, January 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=513192


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Contact Information

David Neumark (Contact Author)
University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-824-8496 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~dneumark/
Public Policy Institute of California ( email )
500 Washington Street
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94111
United States
415-291-4476 (Phone)
415-291-4428 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
Peter Cappelli
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Center for Human Resources ( email )
3733 Spruce Street, Vance Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6358
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/cappelli.html
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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