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A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in China

Zezhong Xiao
Cardiff University

Jay Dahya
City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business

Z. Jun Lin
Hong Kong Baptist University - Department of Accounting & Law



British Journal of Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 39-55, March 2004

Abstract:     
This paper reports the findings of an investigation, through a series of interviews, into the role of the supervisory board (SB) in Chinese listed companies. The interviews were conducted and analysed using the grounded theory methodology. It is found that the SB performs one of four roles under the Chinese corporate environment: an honoured guest, a friendly advisor, a censored watchdog or an independent watchdog. The role of the SB is dependent on a variety of factors: SB characteristics, power relations between the Board of Directors and the SB, shareholding structure, the influence of the Communist Party of China and government, the role of independent directors and the requirements of the corporate law.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: May 01, 2004 ; Last revised: May 01, 2004

Suggested Citation

Xiao, Zezhong, Dahya, Jay and Lin, Z. Jun, A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in China. British Journal of Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 39-55, March 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=513370


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Contact Information

Jason Zezhong Xiao (Contact Author)
Cardiff University ( email )
Cardiff Business School
Colum Drive
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
Jay Dahya
City University of New York, CUNY Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )
17 Lexington Ave., Box B10-225
New York, NY 10010
United States
Z. Jun Lin
Hong Kong Baptist University - Department of Accounting & Law ( email )
Kowloon Tong, Kowloon Hong Kong
+852-3411-7537 (Phone)
+852—3411-5581 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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