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Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investement


Mihir A. Desai


Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

C. Fritz Foley


Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

James R. Hines Jr.


University of Michigan; NBER

March 2004

NBER Working Paper No. w10337

Abstract:     
Affiliate-level evidence indicates that American multinational firms circumvent capital controls by adjusting their reported intrafirm trade, affiliate profitability, and dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable to the effect of 24 percent higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8 percent more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.4 percent higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Together, the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates raise the cost of capital, significantly reducing the level of foreign direct investment. American affiliates are 13-16 percent smaller in countries with capital controls than they are in comparable countries without capital controls. These effects are reversed when countries liberalize their capital account restrictions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: March 15, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Desai, Mihir A., Foley, C. Fritz and Hines Jr., James R., Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investement (March 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10337. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=515762

Contact Information

Mihir A. Desai (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6693 (Phone)
617-496-6592 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
C. Fritz Foley
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6375 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
James Rodger Hines
University of Michigan ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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