Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Barbara K. Buchner
International Energy Agency; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC Working Group III
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4299
This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission-trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20
Keywords: Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, policy
JEL Classification: C72, H23, Q25, Q28working papers series
Date posted: April 7, 2004
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.797 seconds