Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); TILEC
University of Magdeburg
Jan C. Van Ours
Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4298
This Paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effects of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effects that discourage the unemployed from risking benefit sanctions (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: Unemployment benefits, sanctions, experiments, job search
JEL Classification: C91, J64, J65
Date posted: April 7, 2004
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