Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse
Russell B. Korobkin
UCLA School of Law
UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-6
This brief essay, written for a symposium on The Emerging Interdisciplinary Cannon of Negotiation, argues that bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: "I will walk away from the negotiating table without agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand." The source of the ability to make such a threat, and, therefore, the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a "BATNA." The essay elaborates on this claim.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Date posted: March 14, 2004
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