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Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse


Russell B. Korobkin


UCLA School of Law

February 2004

UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-6

Abstract:     
This brief essay, written for a symposium on The Emerging Interdisciplinary Cannon of Negotiation, argues that bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: "I will walk away from the negotiating table without agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand." The source of the ability to make such a threat, and, therefore, the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a "BATNA." The essay elaborates on this claim.

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Date posted: March 14, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Korobkin, Russell B., Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse (February 2004). UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=516066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.516066

Contact Information

Russell B. Korobkin (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-825-1994 (Phone)
310-206-7010 (Fax)
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