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File name: SSRN-id516066. ; Size: 17K
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Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse
Russell B. Korobkin
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
February 2004
UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-6
Abstract:
This brief essay, written for a symposium on The Emerging Interdisciplinary Cannon of Negotiation, argues that bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: "I will walk away from the negotiating table without agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand." The source of the ability to make such a threat, and, therefore, the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a "BATNA." The essay elaborates on this claim.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
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Date posted: March 14, 2004
Suggested CitationKorobkin, Russell B., Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse (February 2004). UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=516066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.516066
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