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IPO Underpricing, Issue Mechanisms, and Size


Nitish Ranjan Sinha


University of Illinois at Chicago

TPM


Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR)

March 22, 2004



Abstract:     
This paper studies the pricing of IPOs in the Indian context. The paper also examines whether the introduction of Bookbuilding has an impact on IPO pricing. The results suggest that IPOs are underpriced. The results also suggest that bookbuilt IPOs show less underpricing than fixed price issues. A more detailed study suggests that this has to do more with the size of the issue than the issue process. A model describing the IPO process in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogenous beliefs is presented. This model suggests that IPO underpricing can be avoided in the presence of selectively informed investors. The model includes the choices on signaling cost, homogenous and heterogeneous beliefs among the investors, entrepreneur holding dilution and issue size that exist for a firm while coming for an IPO. The model suggests that a larger amount of money is left on the table if the entrepreneur holds a lesser amount with herself post IPO. Despite asymmetric information, the high value firm can place an issue without leaving money on the table. The model also suggests that IPO underpricing is unavoidable in a market with information asymmetry and homogenous beliefs among investors. The models predict that underpricing is more severe in the case of smaller issue sizes. This is consistent with the empirical findings.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: IPO Underpricing, Information Asymmetry, India

JEL Classification: G24, G32

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Date posted: March 28, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Sinha, Nitish Ranjan and Madhusoodanan, TPM P, IPO Underpricing, Issue Mechanisms, and Size (March 22, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=520744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.520744

Contact Information

Nitish Ranjan Sinha (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )
Chicago, IL 60612
United States
301-821-5455 (Phone)
T P Madhusoodanan
Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR) ( email )
24 Kothari Road
Nungambakkam
Chennai, Tamilnadu 600034
India
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