Abstract

 
 

Citations



 


 



The Effect of Seller Income Taxes on Acquisition Price: Evidence from Purchases of Taxable and Tax-Exempt Hospitals


Dan S. Dhaliwal


University of Arizona - Department of Accounting

Merle Erickson


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Shane Heitzman


Simon School of Business, University of Rochester


Journal of the American Taxation Association (JATA), Vol. 26, No. 2

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the impact of the seller's tax liability on the price paid in hospital acquisitions. Lock-in theory predicts that for a given asset, asset holders with larger tax liabilities demand a higher price to compensate for income tax liabilities generated on the sale. We apply this theory to a sample of hospital acquisitions by for-profit firms where the primary difference among target hospitals is the seller's tax status - either taxable or tax-exempt. Consistent with the predicted lock-in effect, the evidence indicates that purchase prices are higher when the seller is taxable than when the seller is tax-exempt. Thus, our findings suggest that seller tax liabilities are positively related to purchase prices.

JEL Classification: H24, H25, G34, G32, M41, L31

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: March 29, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Dhaliwal, Dan S., Erickson, Merle and Heitzman, Shane, The Effect of Seller Income Taxes on Acquisition Price: Evidence from Purchases of Taxable and Tax-Exempt Hospitals. Journal of the American Taxation Association (JATA), Vol. 26, No. 2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=521522

Contact Information

Dan S. Dhaliwal
University of Arizona - Department of Accounting ( email )
McClelland Hall
PO Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States
Merle Erickson
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-0716 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Shane Heitzman (Contact Author)
Simon School of Business, University of Rochester ( email )
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
5852734818 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 795

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 1.297 seconds