Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=521682
 
 

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Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and if so, Who Should Pay for It?


Alan D. Morrison


University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Merton College

Lucy White


Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

June 2006

Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2004-FE-08
EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings

Abstract:     
Deposit insurance schemes are increasingly being adopted around the world and yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. In this paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance based around the idea that bankers have valuable but costly monitoring skills. The banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard and so the social benefits of bank monitoring are shared between depositors and their banks. Therefore too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance can correct this market failure. Contrary to received opinion, we find that deposit insurance should be funded not by bankers or depositors but through general taxation. We also show that the optimal level of deposit insurance should vary inversely with the quality of the banking system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: deposit insurance, bank regulation, adverse selection, moral hazard

JEL Classification: G21, G28

working papers series





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Date posted: March 30, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Morrison, Alan D. and White, Lucy, Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and if so, Who Should Pay for It? (June 2006). Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2004-FE-08; EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=521682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.521682

Contact Information

Alan Morrison (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Department of Finance
Park End Street
Oxford OX1 1HP
United Kingdom
+44 18 6527 6343 (Phone)
+44 18 6527 6310 (Fax)
University of Oxford - Merton College
Merton Street
Oxford OX1 4JD
United Kingdom
+44 18 6527 6343 (Phone)
Lucy White
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-0645 (Phone)
617-496-3564 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://pine.hbs.edu/external/facPersonalShow.do?email=lwhite
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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