Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity
Lily Xiaoli Qiu
Brown University - Department of Economics
Brown Economics Working Paper Series No. 2004-21
Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-15
This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund shareholders particularly reduces acquisitions by cash-rich and low-q firms, and by firms seeking to ``buy growth'', after controlling for
ownership endogeneity, firm-level governance structure, and other firm characteristics. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions, Institutional Investors
JEL Classification: G2, G34working papers series
Date posted: April 6, 2004
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