Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity

Qiu, Lily Xiaoli

Abstract

References (67)

Citations (28)

Download This Paper | Share | Email |Add to Briefcase | Purchase Bound Hard Copy

Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity

Lily Xiaoli Qiu

Brown University - Department of Economics

June 2006

Brown Economics Working Paper Series No. 2004-21
Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-15

Abstract:
This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund shareholders particularly reduces acquisitions by cash-rich and low-q firms, and by firms seeking to ``buy growth'', after controlling for
ownership endogeneity, firm-level governance structure, and other firm characteristics. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions, Institutional Investors

JEL Classification: G2, G34

working papers series

Download This Paper

Date posted: April 6, 2004

Suggested Citation

Qiu, Lily Xiaoli , Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity (June 2006). Brown Economics Working Paper Series No. 2004-21; Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=521803

Contact Information

Lily Xiaoli Qiu (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States