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Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'


Daniel Cohen


Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) - Department and Laboratory of Applied and Theoretical Economics (DELTA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Richard Portes


London Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 2004

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4280

Abstract:     
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises

JEL Classification: F33, F34

working papers series


Date posted: April 5, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Daniel and Portes, Richard, Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline' (February 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4280. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=527262

Contact Information

Daniel Cohen (Contact Author)
Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) - Department and Laboratory of Applied and Theoretical Economics (DELTA) ( email )
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France
+33 1 4313 6208 (Phone)
+33 1 4424 3857 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Richard Portes
London Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7000 8424 (Phone)
+44 20 7000 8401 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.london.edu/rportes/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  28
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