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Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'
Daniel Cohen Department and Laboratory of Applied and Theoretical Economics (DELTA) ; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Richard Portes London Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) February 2004 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4280 Abstract: If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.
Keywords: Market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises JEL Classifications: F33, F34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 05, 2004 ; Last revised: June 11, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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