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Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'

Daniel Cohen
Department and Laboratory of Applied and Theoretical Economics (DELTA) ; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Richard Portes
London Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


February 2004

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4280

Abstract:     
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.

Keywords: Market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises

JEL Classifications: F33, F34

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 05, 2004 ; Last revised: June 11, 2004

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Daniel and Portes, Richard, Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline' (February 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4280. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=527262


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Contact Information

Daniel Cohen (Contact Author)
Department and Laboratory of Applied and Theoretical Economics (DELTA) ( email )
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris France
+33 1 4313 6208 (Phone)
+33 1 4424 3857 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Richard Portes
London Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA United Kingdom
+44 20 7706 6886 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 1598 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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