Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=527722
 
 

Footnotes (80)



 


 



Judicial Collegiality, Court Structure, and the Decision to Sit En Banc: Evidence from U.S. District Courts


Ahmed E. Taha


Wake Forest University - School of Law

March 2004

Wake Forest Univ. Public Law Research Paper No. 04-03

Abstract:     
In 1988, almost three hundred federal district judges in nearly seventy federal district courts ruled on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In fourteen of these districts the judges chose to sit en banc to decide the issue; in the other districts, the judges sat individually instead. By comparing the characteristics of the district courts that sat en banc with those that sat individually, and by interviewing judges who participated in the en banc decisions, this Article empirically examines the significance of many factors that might affect the propensity of district courts to sit en banc. It also provides evidence relevant to other courts, including the effect of court structure and composition on judicial collegiality and the propensity to sit en banc. For example, recent proposals to divide or restructure the Ninth Circuit have been based in part upon the belief that en banc proceedings are impractical in a very large circuit. Among the issues this Article examines are how the number of judges and the geographic distances between judges on a court affect collegiality and the likelihood of sitting en banc.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Taha, Ahmed E., Judicial Collegiality, Court Structure, and the Decision to Sit En Banc: Evidence from U.S. District Courts (March 2004). Wake Forest Univ. Public Law Research Paper No. 04-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=527722 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.527722

Contact Information

Ahmed E. Taha (Contact Author)
Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-758-4496 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,081
Downloads: 100
Download Rank: 156,844
Footnotes:  80

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.250 seconds