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http://ssrn.com/abstract=528146
 
 

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The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues


Theodore Eisenberg


Cornell University - Law School

Geoffrey P. Miller


New York University School of Law

March 23, 2004

NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-004; Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 04-019

Abstract:     
This article analyzes a data set of reported decisions from 1992-2003 in which the number of opt-outs and/or objectors to class action settlements was quantified. The numbers of opt-outs and objections were uniformly low and in some cases nearly trivial. On average, less than 1% of class members opt-out and about 1% of class members object to class-wide settlements. Civil rights and employment discrimination class actions have relatively higher objection rates, but even these are less than 5% of the class. Securities, antitrust, and consumer class actions have the lowest rates of dissent. Dissent rises with the average recovery per class member and falls as a percentage of the class as the size of the class increases. Dissent is not correlated with the attorneys fee as a percent of the class recovery. The rate of objection to a settlement is negatively correlated with the chance that the settlement will be approved, but the rate of opt-outs has no correlation with settlement approval. Levels of dissent exhibit a noticeable decline over the period of the study. This study has a variety of implications for the law of class actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

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Date posted: April 12, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Eisenberg, Theodore and Miller, Geoffrey P., The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues (March 23, 2004). NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-004; Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 04-019. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=528146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.528146

Contact Information

Theodore Eisenberg (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Law School ( email )
524 College Ave
Myron Taylor Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-6477 (Phone)
607-255-7193 (Fax)
Geoffrey P. Miller
New York University School of Law ( email )
Center for the Study of Central Banks
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6329 (Phone)
212-995-4590 (Fax)
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