Are There Fast Tracks in Economic Departments? Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists
Aarhus School of Business; Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)
Aarhus School of Business Economics Working Paper No. 04-4
In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our analysis. We find that learning from past performance is an important factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted quickly again. We also find that the handicap is relative, that it does not survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our findings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally, we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career profiles and find that fast tracks are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an effective selection process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Fast track, incentives, sorting, productivity, economic departments
JEL Classification: J41, M51working papers series
Date posted: April 13, 2004
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds