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Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent

Arthur Lupia
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins
University of California, San Diego - Political Science; University of Southern California - Gould School of Law


April 12, 2004


Abstract:     
Several prominent scholars use results from social choice theory to conclude that legislative intent is meaningless. We disagree. We support our argument by showing that the conclusions in question are based on misapplications of the theory. Some of the conclusions in question are based on Kenneth Arrow's famous possibility theorem. We identify a substantial chasm between what Arrow proves and what others claim in his name. Other conclusions come from a failure to realize that applying social choice theory to questions of legislative intent entails accepting assumptions such as legislators are omniscient and legislators have infinite resources for changing law and policy. We demonstrate that adding more realistic assumptions to models of social choice theory yields very different theoretical results - including ones that allow meaningful inferences about legislative intent. In all of the cases we describe, important aspects of social choice theory were lost in the translation from abstract formalisms to real political and legal domains. When properly understood, social choice theory is insufficient to negate legislative intent.

Keywords: Statutory interpretation, legislative intent, general possibility theorem, game theory

JEL Classifications: C70, C71, D71, H10, K00

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 14, 2004 ; Last revised: July 23, 2007

Suggested Citation

Lupia, Arthur and McCubbins, Mathew D., Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent (April 12, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=529742 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.529742


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Contact Information

Arthur Lupia (Contact Author)
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-647-7549 (Phone)
734-764-3341 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: www.umich.edu/~lupia
Mathew D. McCubbins
University of California, San Diego - Political Science ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521 Political Science Mail code: 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States
858-534-3733 (Phone)
858-534-7130 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu
University of Southern California - Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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