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http://ssrn.com/abstract=530163
 
 

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Choosing How to Regulate


Andrew P. Morriss


Texas A&M School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Bruce Yandle


Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Andrew Dorchak


Case Western Reserve University Law Library

April 2004

Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-3

Abstract:     
In this Article, the authors survey how agencies create substantive regulations through traditional rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking and litigation. Using public choice analysis, the Article relates agency choice to the agency's incentive structure. The Article also shows how the different forms of regulatory activity influence the content of agency regulations. Using a case study of EPA's regulation of heavy duty diesel engines, the Article examines EPA's choices over 30 years as a means of testing the proposed theory. Finally, the Article concludes with a critique of allowing agencies to choose how they will regulate because it allows agencies to evade constraints imposed by Congress and the President and so diminishes political accountability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

JEL Classification: K23, K32

working papers series





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Date posted: April 16, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P. and Yandle, Bruce and Dorchak, Andrew, Choosing How to Regulate (April 2004). Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=530163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.530163

Contact Information

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)
Texas A&M School of Law ( email )
1515 Commerce Street
Fort Worth, TX 76133
United States
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Thomas Yandle
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )
Clemson, SC 29634
United States
864-656-3970 (Phone)
864-656-4192 (Fax)
Andrew Dorchak
Case Western Reserve University Law Library ( email )
11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
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