Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems
University of Michigan Law School
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, p. 731, 2004
This Article addresses whether a level or unit of government in a federal system must act only on political self-interest or on an understanding of the needs of the system as a whole. To address this question, this Article compares the dominant U.S. "entitlements" approach, which looks only to political self-interest, with the dominant "fidelity" approach in the European Union and in Germany, which demands that institutional actors temper political self-interest by considering the well-being of the system as a whole.
This Article demonstrates that the fidelity approach actually comes in two significantly different versions: (1) a "conservative" fidelity approach, which undermines democratic federalism by seeking to align the diverse interests throughout the federal system, and (2) a "liberal" fidelity approach, which promotes democratic federalism by preserving constructive democratic intergovernmental engagement throughout the system. This Article concludes that the former should be rejected, but that the latter warrants our attention in the United States as a promising and hitherto neglected alternative to the dominant U.S. approach based on institutional "entitlements."
Number of Pages in PDF File: 95
Keywords: Constitution, constitutional law, European union, Germany, Federalism, interpretation, comparative law
JEL Classification: K10, K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 16, 2004
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