Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=5320
 
 

Citations



 


 



Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed


Arthur Lupia


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins


Duke University


Journal of Law, Economics & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994

Abstract:     
While the delegation of policy-making authority from legislators to bureaucrats is ubiquitous in modern democracies, there is considerable disagreement about the consequences of this type of delegation. Some scholars point to the fact that bureaucrats tend to have policy-relevant expertise, assume that bureaucrats will use their expertise to systematically mislead legislators, and conclude that delegation and abdication are equivalent. Other scholars point to the extensive use of legislative oversight, assume that oversight is sufficient to abate the problems associated with bureaucratic expertise, and conclude that delegation produces more effective governance. We depart from previous scholarship by developing models of delegation and oversight that allow us to derive, rather than assume, conditions under which legislators can adapt successfully to bureaucratic expertise. With these conditions in hand, we identify conditions under which delegation to the bureaucracy produces more effective governance and conditions under which delegation and abdication are equivalent.

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: May 11, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Lupia, Arthur and McCubbins, Mathew D., Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=5320

Contact Information

Arthur Lupia
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-647-7549 (Phone)
734-764-3341 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: www.umich.edu/~lupia
Mathew D. McCubbins (Contact Author)
Duke University ( email )
Department of Political Science
208 Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive
Durham, NC 277080204
United States
(213) 973-7538 (Phone)
(213) 973-3623 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mccubbins.us
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