Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany
Steven N. Kaplan
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994.
This article examines executive turnover--for both management and supervisory boards--and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e., negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments andturnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.
JEL Classification: G12, G32Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 3, 2000
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