Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives
Mihir A. Desai
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
University of Chicago Law School
This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. We develop a simple model that highlights the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. Then, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. In addition, consistent with a prediction of our model, we find evidence suggesting that this negative effect is driven primarily by firms with relatively weak governance arrangements. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the "undersheltering puzzle," and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Incentive Compensation, Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, Diversion, Tax Shelters, Stock Options
JEL Classification: G34, H25, H26, J33, J40, M41, M43, G14
Date posted: April 19, 2004
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.484 seconds