Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations
John E. Core
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Wayne R. Guay
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department
Tjomme O. Rusticus
London Business School; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
We investigate Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) finding that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. If the relation between poor governance and poor returns is causal, we expect that the market is negatively surprised by the poor operating performance of weak governance firms. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant operating underperformance. However, analysts' forecast errors and earnings announcement returns show no evidence that this underperformance surprises the market. Our results are robust to controls for takeover activity. Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns.
This is a revised version of a paper previously titled 'Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Analysts' Expectations' that was originally posted on April 21, 2004.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Market Efficiency, Analysts
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G34, G29working papers series
Date posted: April 21, 2004
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