Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=534042
 
 

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Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine


Margaret Jane Radin


University of Michigan Law School; University of Toronto Faculty of Law


Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, pp. 1-15, 2004

Abstract:     
Two potentially widespread phenomena, mass standardized contracts and digital rights management systems, could have dramatic impact on how the law of property and contract regulates the distribution of intellectual property. This paper argues these phenomena motivate a more careful consideration of (1) their effect on the knowledge-generation incentives that underlie intellectual property, (2) which aspects of the present property and contract regimes are default, waivable rules and which are inalienable entitlements, and (3) whether legislative approval of regulation by machine is best interpreted as a revision of the law of intellectual property or as an attempt to undermine it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

JEL Classification: K11, K12

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Date posted: April 29, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Radin, Margaret Jane, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, pp. 1-15, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=534042

Contact Information

Margaret Jane Radin (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-763-4861 (Phone)
734-763-9375 (Fax)
University of Toronto Faculty of Law ( email )
78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
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