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Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals


Michael E. Bradbury


Massey University

Yuen Teen Mak


National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Accounting

S.M. Tan


affiliation not provided to SSRN

March 2004


Abstract:     
Prior research examines the relation between board characteristics and financial reporting violations relating to fraud and earnings overstatement. This paper examines the relation between governance (as measured by board and audit committee characteristics) and accounting quality (as measured by abnormal accruals) where there is no a priori reason to suspect systematic management of earnings. We find both board size and audit committee independence are related to higher quality accounting (i.e., lower abnormal working capital accruals). Furthermore, the relation between audit committee independence and higher quality accounting exists only when the abnormal accruals are income increasing. This suggests that audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals. The results also indicate that audit committees are effective only when they comprise independent directors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Audit committee, board characteristics, abnormal accruals

JEL Classification: G34, M41, M43, M49

working papers series


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Date posted: May 18, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Bradbury, Michael E., Mak, Yuen Teen and Tan, S.M., Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals (March 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=535764 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.535764

Contact Information

Michael E. Bradbury (Contact Author)
Massey University ( email )
School of Accountancy
Private Bag 102 904
Auckland
New Zealand
64 9 414 0800 (Phone)
64 9 441 8133 (Fax)
Yuen Teen Mak
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Accounting ( email )
BIZ2 Building, #03-32
1 Business Link
Singapore 119591
Singapore
+65 68743032 (Phone)
+ 65 67792083 (Fax)
S.M. Tan
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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