Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=535765
 
 

References (23)



 
 

Citations (13)



 


 



Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts


Rick Harbaugh


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy; Indiana University - Department of Economics

Tilman Klumpp


University of Alberta, Department of Economics

September 2004


Abstract:     
In equilibrium play of a two-round tournament we find that underdogs exert more effort in the opening round while favorites save more effort for the final. Ability differences between players are therefore compressed in the opening round so upsets are more likely, and amplified in the final so blowouts are more likely. Measures that reduce the need to strategically allocate effort across games make for a more exciting final but a less exciting opening round. Consistent with the model, introduction of a one-day rest period between regional semi-final and final matches in the NCAA men's basketball tournament was found to increase the favorite's victory margin in the semi-finals by about five points. Non-sports applications of the model include the allocation of resources across primaries and general elections by candidates and the allocation of resources across a career ladder by managers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Contest, tournament, all-pay auction

JEL Classification: L83, D72, D44

working papers series


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Date posted: April 27, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Harbaugh, Rick and Klumpp, Tilman, Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts (September 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=535765 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.535765

Contact Information

Rick Harbaugh (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2777 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/riharbau/

Indiana University - Department of Economics ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
Tilman Klumpp
University of Alberta, Department of Economics ( email )
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada
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References:  23
Citations:  13

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