|
||||
|
||||
Estate and Capital Gains Taxation: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations
Saku Aura University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) April 2004 Abstract: In this paper a simple dynastic overlapping-generations model with homogeneous agents is used to analyze the optimal use of capital income tax, labor income tax and estate tax. The results of this analysis add to the conventional wisdom about capital income taxation: while it is true that in the long run the estate tax rate should be set to zero, it is also true that other capital income taxation is a usable policy tool even in the steady state. The other contribution of the paper is the building of a simple dynamic political economy model where the structure of capital taxes is determined. In a median-voter framework with no policy commitment, estate taxation is used too heavily as a capital-tax-revenue-collecting tool relative to the second-best optimum for the social planner.
Keywords: Capital income taxation, optimal taxation, political economy JEL Classifications: H21, H24 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 28, 2004 ; Last revised: April 28, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apolloa 1 in 0.296 seconds.