Abstract

 
 

Citations (890)



 
 

Footnotes (62)



 


 



The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1994

Abstract:     
Squeezing out excess capital and capacity is the most formidable challenge now facing the U.S. economy - and indeed, the economies of all industrialized nations. The author draws striking parallels between the 19th century industrial revolution and worldwide developments in the last two decades. In both periods, technological advances led to sharp increases in productivity and dramatic reductions in prices, but also to massive obsolescence and overcapacity. The great M&A wave of the 1890s consolidated some 1,800 firms into roughly 150. Similarly, the leveraged takeovers and LBOs of the 1980s provided healthy adjustments to the overcapacity that was building in many sectors of the U.S. economy.

The author interprets the large shareholder gains from corporate restructurings as evidence of the failure of internal corporate control systems - managements and boards of directors - to deal voluntarily with the problem of excess capacity and asset redeployment. Reform of U.S. corporate governance is an urgent matter and should begin with significant equity ownership by managers and directors, greater participation by outside "active" investors, and smaller and better-informed boards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

JEL Classification: G34, J33, M41

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 7, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C., The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1994. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=544062

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,079
Downloads: 1,011
Download Rank: 94
Citations:  890
Footnotes:  62

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.484 seconds