Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries

Abstract:     
What are the nexuses between corruption, bribery, and wait times in the public allocation of goods in developing countries? This question has received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to analyze models in which a good is allocated publically, first in a non-preemptive corruption regime and then in a preemptive corruption regime. Specifically, for both regimes, we calculate wait times for citizens who pay bribes and for those who do not. Second, we use these wait times to show that bribery is profitable for citizens with a high opportunity cost of time. Third, we show that high and low opportunity cost of time citizens will have dissimilar preferences as far as the corruption regime is concerned. Finally, we conclude with some across citizens and across corruption regimes observations about the value of preemption, the benefit from bribery, and a measure of resource misallocation in the economy.

Keywords: Bribery, corruption, queuing theory, uncertainty, wait time

JEL Classifications: D80, H40, O12

Working Paper Series