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http://ssrn.com/abstract=546104
 
 

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Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

Alan O. Sykes


New York University School of Law

April 2004

U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 211; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 63

Abstract:     
The laws of war forbid states to use force against each other except in self-defense or with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Self-defense is usually understood to mean self-defense against an imminent threat. We model the decision of states to use force against "rogue" states, and argue that under certain conditions it may be proper to expand the self-defense exception to preemptive self-defense. We also consider related issues such as humanitarian intervention, collective security, and the role of the Security Council.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: laws of war, United Nations

working papers series


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Date posted: May 13, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Sykes, Alan O., Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 211; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 63. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=546104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.546104

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Alan O'Neil Sykes
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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