Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=546104
 
 

Citations (5)



 
 

Footnotes (51)



 


 



Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

Alan O. Sykes


Stanford University - Law School

April 2004

U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 211; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 63

Abstract:     
The laws of war forbid states to use force against each other except in self-defense or with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Self-defense is usually understood to mean self-defense against an imminent threat. We model the decision of states to use force against "rogue" states, and argue that under certain conditions it may be proper to expand the self-defense exception to preemptive self-defense. We also consider related issues such as humanitarian intervention, collective security, and the role of the Security Council.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: laws of war, United Nations


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: May 13, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Sykes, Alan O., Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 211; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 63. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=546104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.546104

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Alan O'Neil Sykes
Stanford University - Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 13,163
Downloads: 1,600
Download Rank: 5,916
Citations:  5
Footnotes:  51

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 1.250 seconds