  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in US Entrepreneurial Firms
Martin J. Conyon ESSEC Business School; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Lerong He SUNY College at Brockport; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School April 2004 Abstract: This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.
Keywords: Corporate governance, CEO compensation Working Paper SeriesDate posted: May 15, 2004 ; Last revised: May 15, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo1 in 0.219 seconds.
One-Click Download
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
