Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=547742
 
 

References (35)



 
 

Citations (17)



 


 



Expropriation vs. Proportional Sharing in Corporate Acquisitions


Mara Faccio


Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

David Stolin


Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance

May 2004


Abstract:     
An important and growing literature in finance points to existence of considerable benefits to being a controlling shareholder, especially when legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, and when separation of ownership from control is high. At the same time, the substantial and well established literature on mergers often finds these key corporate events to be subject to agency costs. Relying on these two arguments, we employ a novel application of the Bertrand et al. (2002) insight to study the hypothesis that controlling shareholders use acquisitions to expropriate resources to their benefit. The findings do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of proportional sharing of acquisition gains in favor of the alternative hypothesis of expropriation of bidder's minority shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: M&As, expropriation, controlling shareholder

JEL Classification: G3, G34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 20, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Stolin, David, Expropriation vs. Proportional Sharing in Corporate Acquisitions (May 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=547742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.547742

Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
David Stolin
Toulouse Business School - Economics and Finance ( email )
20, bd Lascrosses - BP 7010
Toulouse Cedex 7, 31068
France
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,796
Downloads: 482
Download Rank: 31,509
References:  35
Citations:  17

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.344 seconds