Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? the Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors
University of Texas at Arlington
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
Edward P. Swanson
Texas A&M University - Mays Business School
April 2, 2007
We investigate incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of stock options "in-the-money" (i.e., stock price above exercise price). Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, raise new debt or equity capital, or have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased (Jensen 2005a) as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 62
Keywords: restatements, stock options, executive compensation, agency theory, overvalued equity
JEL Classification: M14, M41, M43, M52, K22, J33, G34working papers series
Date posted: May 6, 2005
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