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From 'Tragedy' to 'Disaster': Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons DilemmasSven VannesteGhent University - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology Alain Van HielGhent University - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology Francesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna Ben DepoorterUniversity of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 104-122, 2006 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-23 Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-26 Abstract: Recently, a new concept, the anticommons dilemma, has been introduced in economic literature. In an anticommons property regime, multiple co-owners have the right to exclude one another from benefiting from a common resource. The economic literature has unveiled symmetry between commons and anticommons problems. Our experimental results reveal an interesting asymmetry. Anticommons situations generate greater opportunistic behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma (Study 1), and anticommons dilemmas yield a greater risk for underuse compared to commons dilemmas (Study 2). It was therefore concluded that anticommons might be considered as having even more severe and problematic consequences than the commons dilemma.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36 Keywords: Property Law JEL Classification: K00, K11 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 9, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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