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From 'Tragedy' to 'Disaster': Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas
Sven Vanneste Ghent University - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology Alain Van Hiel Ghent University - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology Francesco Parisi University of Minnesota - Law School Ben Depoorter University of Miami - School of Law; Ghent University - Department of Legal Theory and Legal History International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 104-122, 2006 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-23 Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-26 Abstract: Recently, a new concept, the anticommons dilemma, has been introduced in economic literature. In an anticommons property regime, multiple co-owners have the right to exclude one another from benefiting from a common resource. The economic literature has unveiled symmetry between commons and anticommons problems. Our experimental results reveal an interesting asymmetry. Anticommons situations generate greater opportunistic behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma (Study 1), and anticommons dilemmas yield a greater risk for underuse compared to commons dilemmas (Study 2). It was therefore concluded that anticommons might be considered as having even more severe and problematic consequences than the commons dilemma.
Keywords: Property Law JEL Classifications: K00, K11 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 09, 2004 ; Last revised: November 04, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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