The Paradox of Competence
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, (CER-ETH); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4362
We examine a model in which the public is unsure about the competence of a politician, and whether they are concerned about the long-term consequences of their decisions (statesman) or about the public's opinion concerning their competence and preferences (populist). The main finding suggests that the public benefits by disregarding the competence of candidates and by re-electing candidates based on their beliefs about whether a politician is a statesman. This paradox of competence might explain why politicians are so concerned about being perceived as statesmen. We also provide a rationale as to why governing by polls can be detrimental for society. Moreover, our model illustrates in general that delaying irreversible project decisions is a bad signal.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Populists, statesmen, paradox of competence, double-sided asymmetric information, polls
JEL Classification: D72, D80, D82working papers series
Date posted: May 20, 2004
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.953 seconds