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Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action


Pranab Bardhan


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Nirvikar Singh


University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics
May 2004

UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 570

Abstract:     
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: inequality, self-enforcing, collective action, infrastructure

JEL Classification: C72, D30, D70, O10, P0

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Date posted: July 13, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Bardhan, Pranab and Singh, Nirvikar , Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (May 2004). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 570. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=550562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.550562

Contact Information

Pranab Bardhan
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
Nirvikar Singh (Contact Author)
University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )
Social Sciences I
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4093 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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