Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=550884
 
 

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Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law


Michael A. Salinger


Boston University - Questrom School of Business

David S. Evans


Global Economics Group; University of Chicago Law School; University College London


Yale Journal on Regulation, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Tying the sale of products that could be sold separately is common in competitive markets - from left and right shoes, to the sports and living sections of daily newspapers, to cars and radios. This paper presents a cost-based theory for why tying occurs in competitive markets and uses this theory to examine bundling and tying in pain relievers and cold medicines, foreign electrical plug adapters, and mid-sized automobile sedans. It shows that product-specific scale economies are needed to understand tying but that these scale economies might be hard to detect even when they are present. We draw two principle conclusions for tying doctrine. First, per se condemnation in its various manifestations is wrong as a matter of economics. Neither the Jefferson-Parish test in the United States nor the Hilti/Tetra-Pak approach in the EU is capable of screening anti-competitive from pro-competitive tying. Second, if it is hard to establish efficiencies when practices could not arise for anticompetitive reasons, it might also be hard to establish the efficiencies required by the rule of reason or per se approaches. Both approaches are therefore likely to result in the frequent condemnation of efficient tying - that is a high rate of false convictions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 79


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Date posted: May 29, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Salinger, Michael A. and Evans, David S., Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law. Yale Journal on Regulation, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=550884

Contact Information

Michael A. Salinger
Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
617-353-4408 (Phone)
David S. Evans (Contact Author)
Global Economics Group ( email )
111 Devonshire St.
Suite 900
Boston, MA 02108
United States
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
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