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Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing


Stephen M. Bainbridge


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

May 2004

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 04-11

Abstract:     
Courts are now routinely applying the corporate law doctrine of veil piercing to limited liability companies. This extension of a seriously flawed doctrine into a new arena is not required by statute and is unsupportable as a matter of policy. The standards by which veil piercing is effected are vague, leaving judges great discretion. The result has been uncertainty and lack of predictability, increasing transaction costs for small businesses. At the same time, however, there is no evidence that veil piercing has been rigorously applied to affect socially beneficial policy outcomes. Judges typically seem to be concerned more with the facts and equities of the specific case at bar than with the implications of personal shareholder liability for society at large.

A standard academic move treats veil piercing as a safety valve allowing courts to address cases in which the externalities associated with limited liability seem excessive. In doing so, veil piercing is called upon to achieve such lofty goals as leading LLC members to optimally internalize risk, while not deterring capital formation and economic growth, while promoting populist notions of economic democracy. The task is untenable. Veil piercing is rare, unprincipled, and arbitrary. Abolishing veil piercing would refocus judicial analysis on the appropriate question - did the defendant - LLC member do anything for which he or she should be held directly liable?

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: corporation, limited liability, limited liability company

JEL Classification: K22

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Date posted: May 27, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing (May 2004). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 04-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=551724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.551724

Contact Information

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
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