  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
Institutional Stakeholdings and Better-Informed Traders at Earnings Announcements
Ashiq Ali University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management Sandy Klasa University of Arizona - Department of Finance Oliver Zhen Li University of Arizona February 2008 Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming Abstract: Utama and Cready (1997) use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.
Keywords: institutional investors, informed traders, trading volume JEL Classifications: G12, M41, G32 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 03, 2004 ; Last revised: July 02, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.203 seconds.
Download
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
