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http://ssrn.com/abstract=55559
 
 

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The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jesse M. Fried


Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

1997

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 82, pp.1279-1348, 1997
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 224

Abstract:     
In an earlier article, "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy" 105 Yale Law Journal 857 (1996), we suggested that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one. In this paper, we address various reactions and objections to our analysis that have been offered by subsequent work. We also further develop some of the main elements of the analysis in our earlier article with respect to both our analysis of the comparative merits of full and partial priority and our analysis of how a partial priority regime could be implemented. The analysis confirms our earlier conclusion that the case for a full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy is an uneasy one.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 79

Keywords: Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

JEL Classification: G33, K22

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: January 27, 1998 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Fried, Jesse M., The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics (1997). Cornell Law Review, Vol. 82, pp.1279-1348, 1997; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 224. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=55559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.55559

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Griswold Hall 506
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-8158 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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