An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment
affiliation not provided to SSRN
London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Magdeburg
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-57
Many renewable resources are in intergenerational common pools, exploited by one generation after another. In our experiment, the stock available to each generation depends on the extent of exploitation by previous generations and on resource's growth rate, which is either slow or fast. Subjects show altruistic restraint in exploitation, but not enough to achieve the social optimum. The presence of an intergenerational link induces subjects - both in slow and in fast - to expect less resource exploitation from each other than subjects expect in a single generation control. On average, expectations are too optimistic, especially in slow, where intended free-riding behavior is predominant.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: Intergenerational common pool resources, growth and altruism, free-riding intentions
JEL Classification: C72, C92, D62, Q20
Date posted: July 16, 2004
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.328 seconds