Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Universidad Nacional de La Plata - Department of Economics
Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 135-167, May 2000
This paper investigates, empirically, the voters' choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, local governments, fiscal performance, voters' choices
JEL Classification: H72, D72Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 20, 2004
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