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http://ssrn.com/abstract=556281
 
 

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The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules


Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute

Gerrit De Geest


Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law

June 2004

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-24

Abstract:     
Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show under what conditions the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that entirely burden one party. Our analysis applies to comparative negligence, communal liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for non-verifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and to the distribution of shares in partnerships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: comparative negligence, law enforcement, divorce, employment contracts, theory of the firm

JEL Classification: K13

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Date posted: June 11, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and De Geest, Gerrit, The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules (June 2004). Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556281

Contact Information

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roeterstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://darimattiacci.acle.nl
Tinbergen Institute
Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AuUfjxUAAAAJ&hl=en
Gerrit De Geest
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law ( email )
Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
314-398-4941 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www,degeest.wustl..edu
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