More Is Less: A Law-and-Economics Approach to the International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement

Abstract:     
Increased international trade has focused attention on the question of who should be allowed to bring United States antitrust claims. As the distinctions between the "United States economy" and the "global economy" have waned, the problem of which international antitrust cases United States courts should hear has waxed. This Article applies a law-and-economics framework to the major arguments in this debate. In particular, this analysis shows how a broader view of subject matter jurisdiction in these cases not only achieves its own claims of superiority in terms of deterrence, but also might better realize the claimed advantage of the narrow view in reducing antitrust litigation. Under certain assumptions, "more" jurisdiction over international cases can lead to "less" litigation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Antitrust, FTAIA, Sherman Act, jurisdiction, international trade

JEL Classification: K21, K33

working papers series