SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Footnotes (186)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Is There a Text in this Class? The Conflict between Textualism and Antitrust

Daniel A. Farber
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Brett McDonnell
University of Minnesota Law School


November 10, 2004

UC Berkeley Research Paper No. 556380; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-4

Abstract:     
Antitrust opinions rely heavily on economic analysis but little on statutory text. Surprisingly, this text-free mode of interpretation is warmly endorsed by leading textualists such as Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook. We argue that their approach to antitrust is irreconcilable with their general theories of statutory interpretation. Their theory is that the antitrust texts are essentially lacking in content, operating as a delegation of policymaking authority to courts. We undertake a close textualist analysis of the Sherman Act and later antitrust statutes. For the conscientious textualist, the statutory texts are far from being blank checks. For instance, textualists have analyzed common law terms in other statutes far more cautiously than they interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Act, either applying the majority view of the state courts at the time of enactment or choosing among current variants of state common law. Nor do the texts of the antitrust statutes evidence a delegation to the courts - on the contrary, the only clear delegation of antitrust authority is to the FTC. Thus, textualists either need to rethink their theory of statutory interpretation or reconsider their allegiance to contemporary antitrust doctrine.

Keywords: antitrust, textualism, statutory interpretation

JEL Classifications: K21, L40

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 15, 2004 ; Last revised: February 03, 2005

Contact Information

Brett H. McDonnell (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-625-1373 (Phone)
Daniel A. Farber
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Room 894
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0340 (Phone)
510-642-3728 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,251
Downloads: 218
Download Rank: 38,999
Footnotes: 186

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo7 in 0.110 seconds.