Footnotes (148)



A Redistributive Role for Local Government

Minor Myers

Brooklyn Law School

Urban Lawyer, Vol. 36, No. 4, Fall 2004

With the welfare reforms of 1996, the federal government transferred to the states substantial authority over the structure, scope, and generosity of the nation's largest redistributive program, now known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. As many have shown, however, states suffer from a structural handicap - the inability to dissuade new entrants who would be a net drain on the state fisc - that prevents them from matching the redistributive desires of their residents.

This paper argues that local governments, given their unique organizational characteristics, should receive a larger share of redistributive responsibility in the U.S. Unlike the federal government, local governments can respond to local preferences for redistribution and, unlike states, which are subject to the Supreme Court's right to travel doctrine, they have sufficient ability through zoning and property taxation to limit the influx of new recipients.

This paper also articulates in a general way what such a role might look like. In short, local governments should play a larger role in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. Also, states should reinforce the powers that enable localities to be such effective mechanisms of redistribution in the first place so they can redistribute effectively to their own residents and those of neighboring local governments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Local government, zoning, property taxation, migration, welfare magnet, welfare, PRWORA, redistribution, tiebout, public finance, organizational law, fiscal zoning, federalism

JEL Classification: L38

Accepted Paper Series

Download This Paper

Date posted: June 18, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Myers, Minor, A Redistributive Role for Local Government. Urban Lawyer, Vol. 36, No. 4, Fall 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556542

Contact Information

Minor Myers (Contact Author)
Brooklyn Law School ( email )
250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,671
Downloads: 152
Download Rank: 112,994
Footnotes:  148

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.251 seconds